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N IG E R IA : BACKG R O U N D  TO THE CRISIS *
by Lawrence Baraebibai Ekpebu++
It is a sad story to re la te . It is a ta le  o f N igerians k i l l in g  
N ige rians ; o f the d iversion o f scarce resources both human and 
m ateria l to a se lf-d e s tru c tive  w a rfa re . This catastrophe could have 
been averted had selfless leadership , less greed and a greater sense 
o f "g ive  and ta ke " than e x h ib ite d , emerged, as I w i l l  try  to show in 
this le c tu re . A t the root o f the problem w hich has haunted N ig e ria  
since independence were two basic factors: firs t the structure o f the 
N ig e ria n  Federation w hich the British evolved and bequeathed to 
N igerians a t Independence in 1960 was a very shaky one, w ith  the 
N orthern  Region nearly  double in popu la tio n , and in land te rr ito ry  
three times the o ther two (Eastern and Western) Regions com bined1.
The N orth  w h ich was g iven 50% representation in the Federal P a rlia ­
ment was dom inated by the Fu lan i, (conquerors o f that te rr ito ry  before 
the advent o f the British) and the Hausa, w h ile  the East and the West 
were dom inated respective ly  by the Ibo and the Y o ruba . Southern 
N igerians were voca l in th e ir  denuncia tion  o f this N orthern  dom inat' 
o f the Federation , but soon the East under the Ibo leadership struck 
an a llia n c e  w ith  the N o rth , thus pushing the Yoruba West in to  opposi 
Together the Ibo and the N orthern  leaders pounced on the W est, 
creating a M id -W est State o f non-Yoruba tribes^ out o f the West, 
throw ing the leader o f the M a jo rity  Party in Western N ig e r ia , C h ie f 
Awolowo in to  ja i l ,  and setting up a puppet regime in the W est. The 
East-North A llia n c e  was a marriage o f conven ience . It was its fin a l 
rupture in 1966 that led to the sad events o f tha t yea r.
The second fa c to r was the la rge -sca le  corrup tion  tha t 
characte rized  N ig e ria n  p u b lic  l i f e .  In o ff ic e  the p o lit ic ia n s  turned
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the Governm ent treasury in to  a large p riva te  go ld  m ine . To remain 
in o ff ic e ,  they used armed thugs to s ilence oppos ition , m anipu lated 
census figures to ensure be tte r representation fo r th e ir  p o lit ic a l parties 
and rigged e lections in open d a y lig h t. The 1963 census, the 1964 
e lections to the Federal Parliam ent, and the O ctober 1965 e lections 
to the Western House o f Assembly e xh ib ite d  the worst tra its  o f a l l  these 
e v ils , and ,in  spite o f N ig e ria 's  "good" image abroad, showed the 
shaky foundation upon w hich the N a tio n  was b u i l t .
The army coup o f January 15, 1966, was the re fo re , a 
cu lm ina tion  o f a na tiona l crisis in w h ich the former p o lit ic a l leader­
ship had become hated by the general N ig e ria n  pub lic  fo r its large 
scale em bezzlem ent o f pub lic  funds, rigg ing  o f e le c tio n s , its subversion 
o f the p rinc ip les  o f cons titu tion a l behaviour and, g e n e ra lly , fo r its 
oppressive and in to le ra n t measures. That leadership was nevertheless 
ve ry  agreeable in its fo re ign p o lic y  toward the West and the la tte r  
tended in return to heap praises on the N ig e ria n  leadership in the 
W orld  press. True, a man lik e  the la te  Prime M in is te r, A lb a ji Tafawa 
Balewa was b a s ica lly  an honest and good-hearted leader. Y e t the 
record o f his domestic p o lit ic s  was stained both by his excessive sub­
servience to the fe u d a lis tic  persona lity  o f the la te  Sardauna o f Sokoto, 
Premier o f the former N orthern  Region, and by his apparent in a b il ity  
to curb the most ev iden t excesses o f his corrupt colleagues in both the 
Federal and Regional Governm ents. It became c lea r by la te  1965 tha t 
the N ig e ria n  leadership needed more than in te rna tion a l f la tte ry  to 
fo resta ll the erup tion  tha t was bound to  take p lace sooner or la te r.
The eruption  came much sooner than la te r.
The coup then was acc la im ed throughout N ig e r ia ,  a lthough 
i t  was known soon afterwards tha t i t  had been planned and executed 
by young army o ffice rs  o f the Ibo tr ib e . The name o f M a jo r Chukwuma 
Kaduna N zeogw u, leader o f the January coup became a legend in 
N ig e ria n  h is to ry . The coup was not com p le te , how ever, and the 
surv iv ing  members o f the Federal C ab ine t were ab le  to  "hand o v e r"
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the Governm ent to M a jo r-G e n e ra l A g u iy i- lro n s i. There was hope 
nevertheless tha t under Irons! N ig e ria  was f in a lly  on the move to an 
honest and dem ocratic governm ent.
U n fo rtu n a te ly , the fu ll  story o f the p lo t to overthrow  the 
c iv il ia n  governm ent o f Balewa was s t i l l  to u n fo ld . As it  began to 
do so, i t  became c le a r tha t ce rta in  Ibo o ffice rs  among the planners 
d id  not carry out th e ir  assignments in the South, w ith  the result that 
on ly  p o lit ic a l leaders o f N orthern o rig in  (e .g . Balewoand the 
Sarduana o f Sokoto) and th e ir  n o n -lb o  friends in the South (e .g .  the 
late Premier o f Western N ig e r ia , C h ie f A k in to la , a Yoruba, and the 
late Finance M in is te r, O ko tie -E b o h , an Itsek iri) were k i l le d .  Further­
more, most o f the few N orthern  o ffice rs  above the rank o f M a jo r, 
inc lud ing  the most sen ior, one B rigad ier M a im a la ri in the N ig e ria n  
Army were k i l le d .  The N ortherners were therefore qu ite  upset by what 
they regarded as a ca lcu la te d  a ttem pt to e lim ina te  th e ir  leaders and 
Army o ffice rs  by the Ibos. It is pe rtinen t to mention here, tha t M a jo r-  
General Ironsi, h im se lf an Ibo, recogn iz ing  the fury o f the N orth  over 
this one-sided execu tion  o f the coup, d id  his best to appease the 
Northerners by exc lud ing  N orthern  p o lit ic ia n s  from the general c lam ping 
in to  de ten tion  o f most o f the leading p o lit ic ia n s  o f the fa lle n  reg im e.
His c o n c ilia to ry  moves were n o t, how ever, apprecia ted by the younger 
Ibo o ffice rs  who were open ly known to be p lanning a new coup against 
Ironsi to "com p le te " the January coup . To the N orthern leadersh ip , 
th is new th rea t meant on ly  one th in g : the e lim in a tio n  o f more p o lit ic ia n s
and army o ffice rs  o f N orthern  o r ig in . There were strong ind ica tions  by 
A p r i l ,  1966, the re fo re , tha t Northerners were also p lanning a counter 
coup'.
It was in th is state o f a ffa irs  tha t G enera l Ironsi decreed a 
U n ita ry  form o f governm ent fo r N ig e r ia  in la te  M ay, 1966. The N orth  
was suspicious o f the move as they feared tha t a U n ita ry  government 
w h ich a u to m a tica lly  deprived the N orth  o f autonomy cou ld  on ly  mean 
a Southern, e sp e c ia lly  Ibo dom ination o f the N o rth . This fear was
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fu rthe r strengthened by in form ation  reaching the N orth  tha t the then 
G overnor o f Eastern N ig e r ia , M r. O jukw u  had ordered top c iv i l  r 
servants in the East to get ready to take up jobs in the N orth  . A lready  
N orthern  w rath was being pushed to the breaking po in t by Ibo elements 
liv in g  in the N orth  who were said to have d isplayed photographs o f 
G enera l Ironsi and that o f M a jo r Nzeogwu (organiser o f the January 15 
coup and the one who led the assault on the N orth 's  Prem ier, the 
Sardauna o f Sokoto), the la tte r apparen tly  showing Nzeogwu standing 
over the dead body o f the la te  Sardauna. The Ibo elements were then 
reported to have bragged to the N ortherners tha t Ironsi and Nzeogwu 
were the conquerors o f the N o rth . Be tha t as i t  m ay, N orthern  N igerians 
were fu rthe r incensed by what they regarded as acts o f ungratefulness on 
the part o f the Ibos who had con tro lle d  most o f the businesses, and owned 
most o f the modem houses in the N orth  and had live d  unmolested by the 
N ortherners.
The reaction o f the N o rth  to a ll o f these a lleged  provocations 
and threat o f Ibo dom ination were a series o f rio ts a t the end o f M ay , 
1966, in w h ich several Ibos liv in g  in the N orth  were k i l le d .  On th e ir 
pa rt, G enera l Ironsi, as Head o f the N ig e ria n  G overnm ent, and O jukw u 
as a leading member o f tha t Governm ent d id  noth ing to discourage these 
acts o f lawlessness, g e n e ra lly  g iv in g  the Northerners fu rthe r courage 
to stage the coup o f Ju ly  29 , 1966, in w h ich  Ironsi h im se lf lost his l i fe .
It is w id e ly  be lie ved  in N ig e r ia  that the Ju ly  coup by the Northerners 
was staged to  fo res ta ll the second coup w hich was being planned fo r 
ea rly  A ugust, 1966, by the Ibo o ffic e rs . The Ju ly  coup was fo llow ed  " 
in la te  September and e a rly  O c to b e r, 1966, by fu rthe r k ill in g s  o f 
Southern N ige rians  in the N o rth . The Ibos were an obvious ta rg e t, and 
they lost several thousands o f peop le . A  much sm aller number o f o ther 
Southern tribes -  lik e  the Yorubas, the Edos, the I jaws, the E ffiks , e tc .  -  
were also k i l le d .  The Ibos re ta lia te d  by k i l l in g  most o f the 5 ,000  
Northerners who were resident in Eastern N ig e r ia . The Ibos had lost 
over 2 0 ,0 0 0 .
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W ith  the fa ll o f G enera l Ironsi, a compromise cand ida te ,
Yakubu G ow on, an Angas from the M id d le  B e lt, was made Head o f 
the Federal M il i ta ry  G overnm ent. His emergence was something o f 
a surprise to the N ig e ria n  pub lic  as he was gene ra lly  an unknown 
person, p o l i t ic a l ly .  He had served in Ironsi's government as c h ie f 
o f s ta ff and had been sent by B rigadier O gund ipe , the next in command 
to G enera l Ironsi, to go and lobby w ith  the insurgents w ith  a v iew  to 
e ffe c tin g  the release o f G enera l Irons i. The N orthern  soldiers then 
were reported to have arrested Gowon and m ight have shot him but for 
the tim e ly  in te rven tion  o f G owon's fe llo w  M idd le  Belters, the Tivs 
w ho, a lthough a m in o rity  tr ib e , are reputed to be the toughest fighters 
in the N ig e ria n  A rm y. The T ivs, lik e  th e ir  counterparts in the Southern 
Regions, had provided a centre o f s t i f f  opposition to  N orthern Hausa rule 
and had in fa c t been b ru ta lly  suppressed for daring to demand th e ir own 
state w ith in  the federa tion  in the days o f the Sarduana. Coming from a 
small tr ib e , Gowon was accepted as being independent o f the three 
largest tribes (Hausa, Ibo and Yoruba) who had dom inated the N ig e ria n  
scene, and the quarre l between two (Hausa and Ibo) o f whom had brought 
the present c r is is . Furthermore, a lthough a N orthe rner by geographic 
lo ca tio n , he is a C hris tian  and independent o f the Muslim  H ausa-Fu lan i, 
who in the present con tex t o f N ig e ria n  p o lit ic s  constitu te  on ly  a small 
m in o rity  in the Armed Forces o f N ig e r ia .  Under G owon's reg im e, 
the re fo re , the o ld  charges o f "N o rthe rn  dom ina tion " no longer h o ld .
Recognizing the suffering o f Eastern N ige rians  in the N o rth , 
Gowon had made a l l  sorts o f concessions to L t. C o l. O ju kw u  o f the East, 
inc lud ing  decree N o .8 w hich implem ented the "A b u r i"  agreement o f 
our m ilita ry  leaders by crea ting  more pow erfu l regions.
Gowon even w ent on to  share his powers w ith  the m ilita ry  
governors; furtherm ore money was being made a va ila b le  to the 
m ilita ry  governors fo r purposes o f rese ttling  refugees. The biggest 
portion  (£3? m illio n )  o f th is money went to O ju k w u . S t il l the la tte r 
was not sa tis fied  and w ent on to confiscate  Federal Governm ent 
p rope rty , funds, and corporations in Eastern N ig e r ia . O jukw u even
ARTICLES 3 8 .
spent the money the Federal Governm ent made a va ila b le  for rese ttling  
refugees on an execu tive  a irc ra ft for h im se lf and on arms.
Several e fforts were made towards re c o n c ilia tio n  by church 
leaders, top c iv il ia n  leaders, labour leaders, and un ive rs ity  professors, 
a ll to no a v a i l .
As noth ing seemed to satisfy O jukw u  a«d as he was bent on 
breaking up the Federation , the Head o f the Federal M il i ta ry  G ove rn ­
m ent, M a jo r-G e n e ra l Gowon s p lit the country in to  12 states, both to 
satisfy the yearning o f over 28 m illio n  N ige rians  who had constitu ted 
m in o rity  elements in the four former regions and as a move to lend 
s ta b il ity  to the fede ra tion .
This had the e ffe c t o f s p litt in g  the N orth  w hich had always 
been c r it ic ise d  for its predom inant position in the country in to  six 
states. A lso , the East which O jukw u was p lanning to take out o f the 
Federation was sp lit in to  three states.
Now  the East is made up o f four main tribes: the Ibo w ith
seven m illio n  people; the C a labar, the O goja  and the Ijaws who 
constitu te  five  m illio n  peop le . The C alabar and the O go ja  were 
jo ined  to form the South-Eastern State w h ile  the Ijaws were formed 
in to  the Rivers S ta te . The Ibo, O jukw u 's  tribe  in the East now form 
the East C entra l S ta te . (See the new States map on opposite page). 
People o f these two n o n -lb o  States had ag ita ted  fo r separate s ta te ­
hood since co lo n ia l days. Separate delegations representing these 
"m in o r ity "  tribes had always attended and made representations a t 
a ll  the cons titu tion a l ta lks between the British and N ig e ria n  leaders 
before independence. An independent commission (the W il l ink 
Commission) appoin ted by the British in 1957 advised in its Report 
o f 1958, tha t the Rivers area be made a specia l area fo r econom ic 
development purposes, in answer to the demand fo r separate s ta tes .^ 
A lso , a t the pre-independence cons titu tion a l ta lks in London in 1959 
the widespread demand by N igerians fo r the s p litt in g  o f the country 
in to  more states under British auspices came up. The British gave the
ARTICLES 39 .
N igerians two a lte rna tives : ach ieve independence in 1960 under the 
existing arrangements o f three regions, or postpone independence for 
a few years to a llo w  the British to reorganise N ig e r ia  under sm aller 
states.
The N ig e ria n  leaders, anxious for independence in 1960, 
chose the former w ith  the understanding that they themselves would 
see to the states issue la te r. It was this long-stand ing issue which 
Gowon settled  on 27th M ay, 1967.
The in teresting th ing about this long story is that almost a ll 
the o il from the East comes from the Rivers State; O go ja  is the most 
fe r t ile  part o f the East and C alabar is known for its palm produce. 
Throughout N ig e r ia 's  h is to ry , the m a jo rity  tribe  in the East, the Ibo , 
have e xp lo ite d  the C a labar, O goja  and Rivers areas which led to the 
demand by the fiv e  m illio n  people in these areas for th e ir  own states 
for the past fifte e n  years.
In the mass k ill in g s  in the N o rth , the C a labar, O go ja  and 
Rivers peop le , like  o ther southern N igerians  were a ffe c te d . Y e t when 
the crisis began, the Ibo m a jo rity  in the East turned around to  v ic tim is e , 
persecute and murder scores o f people from these "m in o r ity "  areas for 
daring to c a ll fo r a b reak-up  o f the country in to  sm aller units as a means 
o f removing the N orthern  dominance in the country and o f a lle v ia t in g  
the sufferings o f the "m in o ritie s " in the East. The Ibo tr ibe  in the East 
who for a long tim e had advocated the crea tion  o f more States in the 
N o rth , now opposed the crea tion  o f states since i t  would also mean the 
em ancipation o f the fiv e  m illio n  people in the East. ( It sounds almost 
rid icu lous to  ta lk  o f a m in o rity  o f five  m illio n  in the former East region 
o f 12 m illio n  N igerians '. But the seven m illio n  Ibos were in con tro l 
o f the Regional G overnm ent in Enugu and so used po lice  powers to 
suppress the f iv e  m il l io n ) .
Thus, three days a fte r the Federal M il i ta ry  Governm ent s p lit 
the nation  in to  12 states the G overnor o f the East C entra l S ta te , L f. 
C o l. O jukw u dec la red  tha t his state was seceding from the Federation,
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tak ing w ith  him also the South-Eastern (C a laba r-O go ja ) and Rivers 
States which are fu l ly  com m itted to the Federal G overnm ent. Person­
a lly  I feel tha t the unfortunate events o f 1966 no tw iths tand ing , i t  is 
a m istake for any state to secede from the Federation. Yet i f  O jukw u 
and his Ibo tr ibe  wish to secede, it  is th e ir  business once they accept 
to face the consequences o f th e ir  a c tio n . What beats my im agination  
is how they th ink  they can steal w ith  them the two m illio n  people o f 
the Rivers and the three m illio n  o f the South-Eastern (Calabar and 
O goja) States w ith  a combined piece o f te rr ito ry  larger than the Ibo 
East C entra l S ta te . N o  doubt i t  is because o f the natura l resources 
o f these States. A  com parative s itua tion  w i l l  be created i f  the 
G overnor o f Pennsylvania were to decide to secede from the U nited 
States and to a ttem pt to take w ith  him the sister states o f N ew  Jersey 
and N ew  York who are loya l to the U nited  States Federal G overnm ent. 
Suppose, furtherm ore, tha t N ew  Jersey is the o il producing state and 
N ew  York is the most fe r t ile  state'.
In fairness to the Ibo leadership, it  must be stated that the 
massacre o f thousands o f Ibos in the N orth  came as a shock to the 
coun try . As a N ig e r ia n , I am ashamed that such a disregard fo r life  
and property was possible in the coun try . And a lthough some ind iscreet 
Ibo elements resident in the N orth  had provoked the H ausa-Fulani to 
the breaking p o in t, and a lthough the Ibos themselves had started the 
b a ll ro llin g  by the one-sided execution o f the January 1966 coup by 
th e ir  army o ffice rs , ye t the thoughtless k i l l in g  o f innocent women, 
ch ild ren  and o ther c iv ilia n s  in the N orth  cannot be condoned by any 
sane person. Indeed, o ther tribes in Southern N ig e r ia , and espec ia lly  
the Yoruba, the Edo, the Ija w , the E fik , the U rhobo, the Itsek iri who 
had also lost re la tives in the N orthern k ill in g s  sym pathized w ith  the 
predicam ent o f the Ibo : Above a l l ,  even some leading Northerners 
who were e ith e r not invo lved  in the k ill in g s  or who fe lt  tha t the scale 
o f the reprisals went too fa r , were ready to p lay th e ir  part to  he lp  
th e ir aggrieved Ibo brothers. The Ibo leadership , how ever, spumed 
a l l  these gestures and planned fo r secession. One cou ld  not he lp  
ge tting  the fr igh ten ing  impression tha t the massacres in the N orth  were
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not the m ajor reason fo r the secession; but tha t the temporary loss 
o fp o w e r by the Ibos a t the Federal le v e l, as represented by the fa ll 
o f Irons i, and the d iscovery of o il in Eastern N ig e r ia  throw a b righ te r 
lig h t than the massacres on the behaviour o f the ibo leadership .
This v iew  is supported by the foot that secession was be:ng planned 
before the massacres. It was planned in ea rly  June, 1966, and 
in tens ified  a fte r the overthrow  o f Irons? in la te  3 u ly . 1 he massacres 
o f la te  September and early  O ctober m ight therefore on iy  have 
strengthened the hands o f the secessionist elements among the Ibos.
The ro le  o f '’o i l "  in th is secession story is illu s tra ted  by the 
behaviour o f the Eastern de lega tion  to  the A d Hoc C onstitu tiona l 
Conference in August and September, 1966. In a rathei dramat«c 
b reak -th roug h , the de lega tion  from the N orth  w h ich had persistently 
opposed the crea tion  o f more states throughout our h istory announced 
its agreement to  the creation  o f states throughout N ig e ria  ( it  was 
g e ne ra lly  agreed tha t the predominance o f the Tivs, an otherw ise 
small m in o rity  tr ib e  in the N orth  who had persistently fought fo r the 
c rea tion  o f th e ir  state fo r over fifte e n  years, in the N ig e ria n  army in 
a period o f Arm y ru le  had a most persuasive e ffe c t on the N orthern  
d e le g a tio n )1. W ith  this N orthern  acqu iescence, a ll (the N o rth , 
W est, M idwest and Lagos) but the Eastern Region w ho, throughout 
N ig e ria 's  h is to ry  had advocated the crea tion  of states, agreed to 
the c rea tion  o f more states. The East's po s itio n , a lthough surpris ing, 
was nevertheless understandable. In the crea tion  o f states the new 
o il rich  Rivers area o f the Ijaws and the productive  C a la b a r-O g o ja  
areas, n o n -lb o  te rr ito r ie s , w h ich  had persistently charged Ibo 
dom ination and w h ich  ag ita ted  for th e ir  own states since co lon ia l 
days w ould s lip  out o f  Ibo c o n tro l. And so there was a d ip lom a tic  
revo lu tion  rem in iscent o f European p o lit ic s  o f 1756. fD ip lo m a tic a lly  
isolated a t the conference ta b le , O jukw u 's  de lega tion pressed for 
and obta ined a "short b reak" io  a llo w  for consu lta tions. The Eastern 
de lega tion  refused to  return to the conference ta b le , charging that 
the proposition fo r the crea tion  o f states, which would f in a lly  have
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ended the "N orthe rn  dom ina tion " they had always com plained abou t, 
was unaccep tab le . The " o f f ic ia l"  reason w hich the East gave for 
boyco tting  the conference was that members o f th e ir de lega tion d id  
not feel safe in Lagos. In the meantime rumours about planning in 
Enugu for secession were rife  • But it  was during this Eastern boyco tt 
o f the cons titu tion a l ta lks that the N orthern massacres took p lace 
in la te  September and ea rly  O c to b e r. In a sense then , the massacres 
came to rescue the Eastern de lega tion from the rather untenable 
position it  had found its e lf a t the conference ta b le .
It is rather sad for one to discuss this human tragedy in such 
a ca lcu la tin g  sense. Yet one cannot avo id  draw ing the obvious 
conclusions from the sequence o f events w ith o u t standing a chance 
o f com m itting in te lle c tu a l fraud.
PROSPECTS FOR "BIAFRA"
W hat, then , one may ask, are the prospects for O jukw u 's  
secession? In my v ie w , the secession e ffo rt w i l l  not be successful 
because o f the fo llo w in g  factors which the Ibo leadership found its e lf 
unable to consider seriously: F irst, "secession" is a d ir ty  word in
A frica n  p o lit ic s . The fa ilu re  o f Tshombe's Katanga to sustain her 
secession in spite o f the enormous m ilita ry  and fin a n c ia l assistance 
w hich Belgium and o ther powerful Western interests rendered her is 
an in d ica tio n  o f the fu t i l i t y  o f resorting to  "secession" as a so lu tion  
to na tiona l problems. "B ia fra " does not even have the fr ie n d ly  
states lik e  Rhodesia and Portuguese Angola w hich g re a tly  fa c ilita te d  
Katanga's b id  for "independence". M oreover, the m u ltitr ib a l 
structure o f the N ig e ria n  socie ty is ty p ic a l o f most A fr ica n  countries. 
The leaders o f these other A fr ica n  countries must loath O jukw u 's  
ac tion  since secession in theirs m ight be next i f  tr ib a l secession were 
g iven encouragement in N ig e r ia .
Secondly, "B ia fra " is not a homogeneous e n tity  as pointed
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out above. W ith  7 m illio n  Ibos pushing for secession and 5 m illio n  
non-lbos opposed to secession and loya l to the Federal N ig e ria n  
G overnm ent, O jukw u 's  problems w i l l  on ly  have begun, not ended 
w ith  the dec la ra tion  o f " independence". For "B ia fra " is as dependent 
on in te r - tr ib a l cooperation as does the Federal Republic o f N ig e ria ; 
and the Ibo leadership cannot question Eastern N ig e ria 's  membership 
in N ig e ria  w ith o u t a t the same time also question ing the membership o f 
the Ijaws, the Efiks and the Ogojas o f the Rivers and South-Eastern 
States in "B ia fra " . The opposition o f these n o n -lbo  tribes to "Ibo 
dom ina tion " w i l l  grow even stronger than previously since secession 
would have the e ffe c t o f removing the Centra l Government before 
which these tribes had a t least found a p lace to lodge th e ir appeals 
in the N ig e ria n  co n te x t. Furthermore, these "security  r is k " non -lbo  
te rrito ries  in Eastern N ig e ria  have a combined land te rr ito ry  which 
is b igger than the Ibo C entra l State and also account for most o f the 
m ineral o il and the a g r ic u ltu ra l products w hich together constitu te  
about 90% o f the revenues upon w hich  O jukw u  is counting for the 
surviva l o f "B iafra " .
The irony o f O jukw u 's  dilemma is that unable to count on 
the support o f these 5 m illio n  non-lbos in Eastern N ig e r ia , his 
security  forces con tinue  to v ic t im iz e  and harass the Ijaws, Efiks and 
the Ogojas as "security  risks ". Hundreds o f the leaders from these 
areas inc lud ing  doctors, lawyers and c iv i l  servants are in O jukw u 's  
ja ils .  O thers have been k il le d ;  as a result he on ly  a liena tes them 
fu rthe r. In o ther words, O jukw u 's  re b e llion  against the Federal 
M ilita ry  G overnm ent has a b u i l t - in  v ic tim iz a tio n  and dom ination 
by the Ibos over the 5 m illio n  non -lbos , a fac t w hich fu rthe r exposes 
the i l lo g ic a l i ty  o f "B ia fra " . Therein lies the v ic ious  c irc le :
A secession movement w hich tries to ju s tify  its e lf  on the theory o f 
"N orthe rn  d o m in a tio n " (which no longer exists) its e lf feeds on the 
dom ination o f others tribes . To put it  another w ay , why does the Ibo 
leadership argue tha t th e ir  attem pted secession is based upon the 
p rinc ip les o f se lf-de te rm ina tio n  for the Ibos and yet refuse a t the same
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time the 5 m illio n  Ijaw s, Efiks and Ogojas th e ir own se lf-de te rm ina tion?  
The question w hich  the Ibo leadership has refused to ask themselves is 
why they th ink  that these non-lbos in Eastern N ig e ria  w ould rather 
liv e  together and share a common destiny w ith  the Ibos a lo n e , rather 
than w ith  the Yoruba, the Hausa, the B in i, and the Its e k ir i, e tc .?
A SOUTHERN FRO NT?
The th ird  fac t w h ich works against O jukw u is the fa c t tha t 
by th is  attem pted secession, he has a liena te d  and un ited  the rest o f 
the country (49 m illio n )  against his people (7 m il l io n ) .  O r ig in a lly ,  
the O jukw u  Governm ent had counted on the emergence o f a "Southern 
F ron t", an a llia n c e  o f the Eastern, M idwestern and Western Regions 
w hich cou ld  have g re a tly  strengthened O jukw u 's  hands -  had it  
m a te ria lised . But the poss ib ilities  for such a developm ent must now be 
ruled out fo r a number o f reasons. First, such an a llia n c e  cou ld  on ly  
have arisen out o f and sustained by a common Southern fear o f 
"N o rthe rn  d o m in a tio n ". How ever, w ith  the crea tion  o f states on 
M ay 27 , 1967, in w h ich  the N o rth  was s p lit in to  six states, this fear 
has been rem oved. The exercise brought s ta b ility  to the structure o f 
the N ig e ria n  Federation and served not on ly  to reassure the fears o f 
the Western and M idwestern States but also removed the one reason 
upon w h ich  the Ibos (who had always advocated the crea tion  o f States) 
were p lanning to base and ju s tify  th e ir  secession (its irre levance  not 
w iths tand in g , O jukw u s t i l l  used N orthern dom ination as a reason for 
his "secession" on June 30, 1967). But for purposes o f in fluenc in g  a 
"Southern F ron t", o ther Southerners were no longer impressed by i t .  
M oreover, as po in ted out above, the N o r th ’s Hausa-Fulani constitu te  
on ly  a small m in o rity  in the N ig e ria n  Armed Forces w hich ru le  N ig e ria  
to d a y .
A  second reason why a "Southern Front" cou ld  not emerge is 
tha t such a fron t w ou ld  have been m eaningfu l on ly  w ith in  a N ig e ria n
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co n te x t. The ra tiona le  for it  w ould have been tha t a b igger Southern 
front w ould be a more e ffe c tiv e  check on the big N orth  than the then 
in d iv id u a l Southern Regions. N o w , w ith  O jukw u 's  "secession", the 
East w ould no longer be an e ffe c tiv e  partner in such an a llia n c e .
O jukw u 's  "secession" has thus had the e ffe c t o f strengthening the 
support o f the Yorubas for the Federal G overnm ent, for on ly  when 
O jukw u is defeated and kept w ith in  the Federation could the East 
serve any useful purpose as an " a l ly "  against the N orth  -  even i f  the 
issue o f "N o rthe rn  d om ina tion " were s t i l l  a l iv e .
The th ird  fac to r w h ich destroys the idea o f a "Southern Front" 
stems from the a ttitu d e  o f the former Eastern N ig e ria 's  Government 
toward o ther Southerners. It charged its grievances on the treatment 
w hich Ibos rece ived  from the Hausa-Fulan i o f the N o rth ; ye t in its 
re a c tio n , the Enugu regime fought against a l l  o ther N ige rians : First,
in O c to b e r, 1966, O jukw u  ordered a j j  non-Easterners out o f the East.
The N ortherners were k i l le d ,  but the o ther non-Eastemers who were 
ev ic ted  were Yorubas, B in is, Itsek iris , Urhobos, e tc . ,  many o f whom 
were not g iven  tim e to pack th e ir be long ings, much less make e ffe c tiv e  
arrangements fo r th e ir  p roperties. M any had live d  in the East a l l  th e ir 
lives . W ithou t exceptions they lost th e ir  jobs and other means o f l i v e l i ­
hood in the East and returned to th e ir  Regions o f o rig in  as poor refugees. 
Their expulsion from the East was said to be a "tem porary" one "in  the ir 
own in te re s t" . They have not been a llow ed  to return yet'.
S econd ly , the Enugu G overnm ent seized Federal ins titu tions 
and properties owned jo in t ly  by a j j  N ig e ria n s . M oreover, O jukw u 's  
secession was from the w hole o f N ig e r ia , not from the N orth  a lo n e .
In th e ir  reaction  to  the N o rth , the re fo re , the Ibo leadership made no 
d is tin c tio n  between the N orth  and the rest o f N ig e r ia . F ina lly  to 
expect a Southern a llia n c e  under these circumstances is therefore 
expecting  too much from Southern N ige rians who are capable o f making 
th e ir own decis ions, and espec ia lly  the Yorubas who have a much longer 
cu ltu ra l and educa tiona l h istory and are s t i l l  ahead o f the Ibos in educa tion .
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The recent speeches o f C h ie f A w o low o , Federal Commissioner for 
Finance and leader o f the Yorubas, in w h ich he stated c a te g o r ic a lly , 
his " irrevocab le  com m itm ent" to the Federal Governm ent and to 
N ig e ria n  u n ity ,  serve as a fin a l statement o f Southern op in ion  on 
the N a tio n a l c ris is .
THE "BIAFRA" V IEW PO IN T
The above analysis does not posit tha t the Ibos d id  not 
have a case. Indeed, o f a l l  sides o f the N ig e ria n  c ris is , they had 
the best case; they had a genuine case o f grievance stemming from 
the massacres in the N o rth . Apologists for the N orth  have argued 
that the N orthern  massacres were an appropria te  N orthern  re ta lia tio n  
l o the events o f January 1966; but these apologists overlook the 
na tiona l ills  w h ich  instiga ted the January coup. They also overlook 
the fact th a t, condemnable as the one-sided k ill in g s  by Ibo o ffice rs  
was, they nevertheless lim ite d  these k ill in g s  to p o lit ic ia n s  and army 
o ffice rs , u n like  the N orthern  re ta lia tio n  w hich extended the k ill in g s  
to men, women and c h ild re n . The analysis does pos it, how ever, tha t 
O jukw u overp layed his hands. In fa c t, in th e ir  e ffo rts  to defend them ­
selves against the N orthern  massacres and th e ir  tem porary loss o f power 
in Lagos, the Ibo leadership its e lf became unreasonable and v in d ic t iv e ,  
not o n ly  in k i l l in g  N ortherners in the East and sending a l l  non-E ast- 
erners pack ing , but also in two o ther ways: F irst, the leadership argued
tha t the long resistance w hich the N orth  had put up against the crea tion  
o f states w h ich  w ould have ensured a h e a lth ie r and more equ itab le  
d is tr ib u tio n  o f power in the coun try , the overthrow  o f fbe Ironsi regime an; 
the acts o f in to le rance  shown to the Ibos in the N orth  showed c le a r ly  
that the N orth  d id  not care fo r Southern (espec ia lly  Ibo) p a rtic ip a tio n  
in the leadership o f the N ig e ria n  Federation . Therefore the N orth  must 
be made to apprec ia te  the re a lity  o f the im portance o f the South in 
N ig e r ia  and see the d ram atiza tion  o f  the N o rth 's  dependence on the 
South for her (N o rth 's ) access to the sea. A cco rd in g ly  the Ibo leadership
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did  four th ings: F irst, it  deta ined o n e -th ird  o f the N ig e ria n  Railways
ro llin g  stock w hich was then in Eastern N ig e r ia , thus reducing the means 
which the nation  had provided to convey produce from the N orth  to the 
sea. Secondly, the East b locked N orthern  use o f the Eastern branch 
o f the N ig e ria n  Rail w hich runs from the N orth  to the Port Harcourt 
seaport w h ich  is situated in Eastern N ig e r ia . T h ird ly , the East seized 
Northern produce, mostly groundnuts w h ich  were aw a iting  shipment 
abroad a t the Port H arcourt W harf. F in a lly , Enugu tried  to persuade 
the Western Region to place o. s im ila r res tric tion  on N orthern access to 
the Sea through the W est. O f these steps those carried  out in the East 
(the firs t three) were successful and m ight have played no in s ig n ifica n t 
role in persuading the N orth  to the acceptance o f many requests made 
on her by the W est, in c lud ing  the agreement to remove N orthern troops 
from the West and the creation  o f more states (p a rtic u la r ly  in the N o rth ). 
The East's e fforts to persuade the West to punish the N orth  d id  not work 
both because o f the re la tive  m ilita ry  weakness o f the la tte r and because 
the success o f such a b lockade on the Western fron t depended on the 
proposed Southern front w h ich never m a te ria lize d ,
*
In a second area o f v ind ic tivene ss , the East sought to punish 
the N orth  through the issue on revenue a llo c a t io n . Here the Ibo 
leadership argued that since the Ibo w ould no longer feel safe in the 
N o rth , they w ou ld  no longer bene fit from the economic benefits w hich 
arise from membership o f a large coun try , Under these circum stances, 
and, in v ie w  o f the greater number o f Ibos who had returned to the 
East because o f the disturbances o f 1966, fo r w h ich  the Eastern govern­
ment must ca te r, revenue derived  from the East must not be a llow ed  to 
he lp  deve lop the N o r th . The assumptions here were that w ith  o il 
revenues now accru ing  from the East, the la tte r was co n tribu ting  more 
to , than she was rece iv ing  from , the o ther regions. Furthermore, it  
was c a lc u la te d , tha t the M id -W est was also con tribu ting  a l i t t le  more 
than she was re ce iv in g ; the West was rece iv ing  as much as she was 
con tribu ting  w h ile  the N orth  was rece iv ing  more than she was con tribu ting  
to Federal co ffe rs . The opera tive  system o f revenue a llo c a tio n  which was
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based on both "de riva tion  and need" was no longer acce p ta b le . It 
should now be based on "d e r iv a tio n "  o n ly , o r, be tte r s t i l l ,  each 
Region should keep its own resources, co n tribu ting  on ly  such amounts 
as were necessary to m ain ta in  a common services type o f organisation 
in Lagos. W ith  such a new system, the Ibo leadership argued, the 
N orth  w ou ld  co llapse , e co n o m ica lly .
The results w h ich  these v in d ic t iv e  approaches to the N ig e ria n  
crisis produced are very in te res ting . A few observations on the approaches 
themselves must be made: F irst, the th ink ing  o f the Ibo leadership
com p le te ly  ignored the fac t tha t they in fa c t were the c h ie f bene fic ia ries  
o f N orthern "dom ina tion " since N ig e r ia 's  a tta inm ent o f independence.
The N orth  d id  not rule alone but d id  so in a llia n c e  w ith  Ibo leadersh ip . 
Together they pushed the Yoruba leadership in to  { a i l ,  destroyed C h ie f 
Aw olow o's A c tio n  G roup and set up a puppet regime in Western N ig e ria  
in 1962. The N orth  provided the numbers in parliam entary strength; but 
i t  was the be tte r educated Ibo who occup ied the top positions in the 
Balewa a dm in is tra tion . Secondly, the Ibo leadership ignored the fact 
that no one Region has borne a d isproportionate share o f the econom ic 
burden o f the Federation fo r very long . In the 1930's O il  Palm and 
Kernel from the East was the c h ie f con tribu to r o f Federal revenue. In 
the 40's groundnut from the N orth  was added, and in the 1 950's cocoa 
from the West p layed tha t leading ro le . In tu rn , the w orld  market 
turned an e v il eye on these products. A l l  the Regions had, a cco rd in g ly , 
en joyed the benefits  o f be long ing to a b igger Federation . To argue now 
that the N orth  be now denied a share o f the w in d fa ll in the East was 
u n re a lis tic .
F in a lly , to deal w ith  the issues o f "access to the sea" and 
o f "revenue a llo c a t io n "  as pure ly  reg ional matters w ith o u t reference 
to the whole na tiona l con tex t was probably sound in the v iew  o f the 
Ibo leadership , but i t  was short-s igh ted in the lo n g -ru n . For when the 
fu ll na tiona l im p lica tions  o f those v in d ic t iv e  approaches to the crisis 
began to take shape, the results w h ich  fo llow ed  were those least expected 
and least desired by the Ibo leadership: On the issue o f "access to the
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sea", for instance, when o ther tr ib a l units in N ig e ria  began to press the 
Ibo argument to its lo g ica l conc lus ion , it  became c lea r that the Ibos 
themselves were land locke d , and depended on the Ijaws and the Calabars 
for access to the sea1. The crea tion  o f states c le a r ly  dram atized this 
fa c t. In fa c t the three main tr ib a l units -  the Hausa-Fulani o f the N o rth , 
the Yoruba o f the West and the Ibo o f the East who had dominated the 
N ige rian  governm ent throughout her h is to ry , have, under the new structure 
o f N ig e r ia , now become dependent on other sm aller states for access to 
the sea'. For the W est, Lagos is a sister Yoruba s ta te , and w ith  the re - 
approachment tha t now exists between the N orth  and the rest o f the country, 
i t  is the Ibo Fast C entra l State a lo n e , w ith  its antagonism o f the Rivers and 
Calabar people to the South, that stands to suffer from the tr ib a liz a tio n  of 
the issue o f "access to the sea".
The second fro n t, tha t o f "revenue a llo c a t io n "  also boom- 
eranged w ith  eq u a lly  disastrous e ffects on the Ibos. For, the o il as pointed 
out above, comes p redom inan tly , from the Rivers State o f the I jcw  peo_pje, 
not from Ibo te r r ito ry . M oreover, most o f the a g ricu ltu ra l w ea lth  o f the 
East is concentrated in the C a laba r-O go ja  a rea . Revenue a llo ca tio n  
based on "d e r iv a tio n "  a lone as the Ibo leadership w anted , now holds for 
the Ibos the same econom ic strangu la tion  w hich they had planned for the 
North '. The lesson that one could draw here is that the N ig e ria n  tribes 
are in te r-dependen t c u ltu ra lly ,  econom ica lly  and p o l i t ic a l ly ,  and that 
in seeking solutions to na tiona l problems such as are fac ing N ig e r ia , 
compromise, w h ich  w i l l  guarantee and strengthen these in te r- tr ib a l ties 
and cooperation rather than "extrem e" actions like  "secession11 meet the 
demands o f s e lf- in te re s t and commonsense.
TH : ALTERNATIVES FOR ARMED C O N FLIC T
"W hy th e n " , N ig e ria 's  many friends around the w orld  have 
been ask ing , "have N ig e ria n  leaders not explored n o n -v io le n t a lte r ­
natives to this war o f se lf-d e s tru c tio n ?  Many reca ll no doubt that
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N ig e ria 's  path to independence in 1960 was marked by a series o f 
cons titu tion a l conferences in w h ich  G reat B rita in  and N ig e ria  peace­
fu lly  planned in the s p ir it o f "g ive  and ta k e " . Why then, they wonder 
in agony, has this sp ir it fa ile d  to guide N igerians during this na tiona l 
cris is?
A  close analysis o f the events o f 1966-67 in N ig e ria  in d ica te , 
how ever, tha t peacefu l a lte rna tives  to armed c o n flic t  were tr ie d , but 
w ere , u n fo rtu n a te ly , used as breath ing space by the leadership in 
Enugu for preparing for secession. In fairness to M r. O ju kw u , it  must 
be said tha t he h im self ind ica ted  genuine concern for a peacefu l so lu tion 
in the ea rly  days (May -  la te  September, 1966) o f the N ig e ria n  c ris is , 
but the hands o f the planners for secession were strengthened beyond 
his con tro l by the September and O ctober massacres o f Ibos in the N o rth . 
From then on, he was not on ly  won ove r, but assumed the leadership 
o f the Ibos for secession. On the part o f the Federal M ilita ry  G overn ­
m ent, G eneral G ow on, sym pathetic to the p lig h t o f the Ibos and con­
c il ia to ry  almost to a fa u lt ,  d id everyth ing  possible to keep the flame 
o f peacefu l settlem ent going; but fo r these efforts he eafned from the 
Ibo leadership on ly  the contemptuous t i t le  o f "a w e a k lin g " , and boyco tt 
o f meetings summoned by him: The firs t experim ent a t peacefu l
se ttlem ent, and the Ad Hoc C onstitu tiona l Conference w hich met from 
September 12 to 29 , 1966 a t Gowon's in v ita t io n , was boycotted by 
O jukw u 's  de lega tion  a fte r September 24 , on the issue o f the "crea tion  
o f states" and la te r on excuses o f lack o f safety in Lagos.
A fte r  the A bu ri m eeting in G hana, a t w hich Gowon and the 
o ther m ilita ry  governors, in deference to the sufferings and feelings 
o f the Ibos, p ra c tic a lly  a llow ed  O jukw u to d ic ta te  the d ire c tio n  and 
rate o f discussions, committees o f legal and fin a n c ia l experts were set 
up to study the agreements w ith  a v iew  to draw ing up a decree fo r 
im plem enting these decis ions. The committees m et, studied the 
decisions and drew up reports embodying both areas o f agreement and 
referred ce rta in  matters back to the m ilita ry  leaders for fu rthe r 
d ire c tio n . It was obvious tha t meetings o f the Supreme C ounc il were
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necessary to form ulate the required d irections for the experts and f in a lly  
to agree on the decree that would implement the A bu ri cjecisions. Yet 
O jukw u took the position that he w ould not a ttend any meeting o f 
Supreme C ouncil u n til the A bu ri decisions were im plem ented. A  v ic ious 
c irc le  had been in troduced by Enugu: Gowon and the o ther m ilita ry
governors cou ld  not promulgate a decree im plem enting the A buri decisions 
w ithou t O jukw u 's  concurrence . O jukw u was sure to re ject such a decree. 
Yet every day the m ilita ry  governors w a ited  in an e ffo rt to obta in O jukw u 's  
p a rtic ip a tio n  was, for O ju k w u , a d d itio n a l "e v id e n ce " that Gowon was 
de lay ing the im plem entation o f the decis ions. In frustra tion the Supreme 
C ouncil met several tim es, w ith  O jukw u boyco tting  these m eetings, and 
promulgated decree N o .8 w hich fu lly  implemented the A bu ri decisions 
which had aimed a t re turn ing the country to the status quo ante the Coup 
o f January 15, 1966. The decree even w ent fu rther to create stronger 
regions by establish ing M il i ta ry  A rea Commands and requ iring  the con­
currence o f a l l m ilita ry  governors on certa in  v ita l decisions o f the Supreme 
C o u n c il. In a d d it io n , Gowon changed his t i t le  from "Supreme Commander" 
to "C om m a n d e r-in -C h ie f" o f the Armed forces o f N ig e r ia , a l l  in order to 
meet O jukw u 's  demands. M r. O jukw u  re jected  decree N o .8 nevertheless.
D iffe re n t leve ls o f N ig e ria n  leaders then took th e ir  turn to 
express th e ir app rec ia tio n  o f the p lig h t o f the Ibos and to plead w ith  
O jukw u and the Ibo leadership fo r forbearance. A  de lega tion  o f Yoruba 
Obas and Chiefs from Western N ig e r ia  v is ite d  a ll the m ilita ry  leaders a t 
the la tte rs ' c a p ita ls . A t Enugu the elders unzipped th e ir  purses and made 
contribu tions toward the re h a b ilita tio n  o f refugees in the East. The Ibo 
leadership was unm oved. Both the governor o f Western N ig e r ia , B rigad ier 
A debayo, and his counterpart in the M id -W e s t, B rigadier E joor, paid 
v is its  to O jukw u and announced a fte r th e ir meetings w ith  the East's 
governor o p tim is tic  forecasts for an ea rly  settlem ent o f the N ig e ria n  
problem . The governors had hard ly  le ft O jukw u when the la tte r  d is­
owned the claim s o f "ag reem ent". A conference o f N ig e ria n  U n ivers ity  
Lecturers, Professors and Adm inistrators under the leadership o f Professor 
Babs Fafunwa drew up proposals for a peaceful settlem ent o f the N ige rian
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problem which stated the ir conv ic tion  on the ind iv is ib i l i ty  o f N ig e r ia , 
the ir b e lie f that there was no peaceful way o f breaking up N ige ria  
and made provisions for fu ll financ ia l assistance to the aggiieved Ibos 
from Federal Government funds, to be supplemented by a special tax 
on a ll non-lbo  N igerians as an expression o f the la tte r's  "c o lle c tiv e  
g u i l t "  for the events o f 1966. O jukwu did not even acknowledge 
receipt o f these proposals. O jukwu then went on to confiscate Federal 
Funds, seize ten Federal Corporations in the East and seize two aero­
planes o f the N igerian Airways among o ther things. Gowon app lied  
only lim ited  economic sanctions on the East.
In a fina l desperate e ffo rt, a group o f eminent N igerians 
inc lud ing the C h ie f Justice o f the Federation, Sir Adetokunbo Adem ola , 
the D irector o f the N igerian  Institute o f International A ffa irs , D r. 
Lawrence Fabunmi, a leading N igerian economist, Professor Samuel 
A lu ko , a former (N igerian) Under-Secretary and Special Assistant to 
the United Nations S ecre tary-G enera l, M r. Godfrey Amachree, a 
famous N igerian anthropologist, D r. O ko i A rikp o , and led by C h ie f 
Obafemi Awolowo dashed to Enugu and saw O jukw u . Prior to this 
mission, C h ie f Awolowo had made statements which c le a rly  showed 
his sympathies w ith  O jukw u, a fact which made most N igerians p red ic t 
a positive O jukwu response to the efforts o f the peace mission. This 
last peace mission o f eminent N igerians under the leadership o f A w olow o 
produced recommendations which ca lled  for the simultaneous w ithd raw a l 
by Gowon o f economic sanctions against the East on the one hand, and 
the release by O jukwu o f seized Federal Government statutory bodies 
and other assets and properties o f the federation . General Gowon 
accepted ajj_the recommendations. O jukwu turned them down. In the 
meantime there was c lea r ev idence , that O jukwu was both arming 
seriously and planning for secession. S till Gowon stopped a t sanctions* 
Force was not used.
Then came O jukw u 's "independence" proclamation o f May 30 th , 
1967, three days a fte r Gowon had sp lit the country- in to tw e lve states,
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a measure w hich met the long-standing demand o f the Ibos and other 
Southern N ige rians for the equa liza tion  o f the units o f the Federation, 
and that o f the various 'm ino ritie s " who had persistently fought against 
dom ination o f the various Regional Governments under which they had 
been p laced .
O jukw u had overp layed his hand, a n d a f that po in t the 
Federal M il i ta ry  Government was given no choice but fig h t to protect 
the te rr ito r ia l in te g rity  o f the co u n try . For no nationa l leader, regard­
less o f sex, re lig io n  or ideo log y , and regardless o f what motives impel 
such an a c t o f secession, w i l l  s it down and watch his or her country 
b a lka n ize d . W hat G eneral Gowon was forced to do on the 30th M ay, 
1967, nam ely his pa in fu l decision to use force as a last resort to protect 
the na tiona l te rr ito r ia l in te g rity  o f N ig e ria  is what was expected o f any 
responsible Head o f G overnm ent.
The Americans d id  precise ly this in th e ir c iv i l  w ar o f 1812; 
the Republic o f the Congo (Kinshasa) w ith  the assistance o f the whole 
in te rna tion a l com munity under the United N ations fought and defeated 
M r. Tschombe s e fforts to ba lkan ize  the coun try . If M r. O jukw u were 
Head o f the Federal N ige rian  G overnm ent, he would have made the 
same decis ion w hich Gowon made. Better s t i l l ,  i f  O ju k w u fs dreams o f 
an independent B ia fra 11 were to be re a lize d , and i f ,  as expected , the 
5 m illio n  non-lbos o f the South Eastern and Rivers States decided to 
secede" from "B ia fra 11, O jukw u would most strenuously fig h t to fo re ­
s ta ll such a m ove.
If cou ld be assumed, the re fo re , that the Ibo leadership must 
have known the in e v ita b il ity  o f this b loody war o f N igerians against 
N ige rians and the senseless destruction o f N ig e ria 's  a lready scarce 
m ateria l and human resources which was bound to fo llo w  the ir dec la ra tion  
o f "secession". The mental agony which strikes one is the question:
Why d id  the Ibo leadership , a h igh ly  educated and genera lly  a r ticu la te  
group o f men, whose people had a lready suffered so much in the events
ARTICLES 54.
o f 1966, be b linded by o il po litic s  fo subject these same people to 
further m isery? Why in fa c t, did they not take advantage o f the 
overwhelm ing sympathy which they enjoyed both in N ig e ria  and 
abroad to strike out a good bargain for the ir people w ith in  the N ige rian  
context instead o f this fu tile  resort to an extreme action  which on ly  
resulted in the enthronement in N ig e ria  o f fu rther bitterness and distrust 
among its other various ethnic groups on the one hand and the Ibos on 
the other?  It is like  a young man liv in g  on the 10th floo r o f an a p a rt­
ment b u ild in g , whose parents have just been murdered by an assa ilan t.
The young man is angry; he is b itte r; he is frigh tened . Yet he must 
try and keep his senses and descend the stairs or take the l i f t  (e levator) 
downstairs as he wishes to ca ll the p o lice . HE MUST N O T JUMP OUT 
THROUGH THE W IN D O W  A N D  KILL HIMSELF. Nobody, inc lud ing  
the Police would pardon him i f  he d id . The Ibos suffered a most trag ic  
fate in 1966 but what its leadership has done is to lead the Ibo people 
in to  a suicide jump through the window on the 10th f lo o r. On the 
economic side the Ibos should not have assumed that the ir f ig h t w ith  
the Hausa-Fulani in the North e n titled  them (the Ibos) to the o il w ea lth  
o f the Rivers and the ag ricu ltu ra l wealth o f the C a laba r-O go ja  peop le .
It may also be asked i f  there was not a peaceful a lte rn a tiv e  
to Federal M ilita ry  action against "B ia fra ". Here it  must be stated 
that the a lte rna tive  to Federal Government action  was not peace but 
a worse, uncontro llab le  reign o f v io le n ce . The 5 m illio n  "m inorities  
who are now figh ting  in the campaign on the side o f the Federal troops 
would most lik e ly  have revolted on the ir own against the au tho rities  in 
Enugu. It is also certa in that this would have been aided by o ther 
sections o f the Federation o f N ig e ria ; and what would have fo llow ed  
would have been a d irection less, indiscrim inate tr ib a l w arfa re . W ith  
the current Federal Government a c tio n , there is d irec tion  w ith  lim ite d  
objectives: For the Federal Government under M a jo r-G enera l Gowon
does not condemn a|£ Ibos. The government's position is tha t the vast 
m ajority  o f Ibos are good c itizens o f whom N ige ria  has been and w i l l  
continue to be proud; but that these people have been misled by a greedy
ARTICLES 55.
and e rra tic  leadership in to  a secession which is not in the best interest 
o f the Ibos themselves fo r two reasons:
F irst, the 7 m illio n  Ibos in Eastern N ig e ria  occupy a re la tive ly  
small overcrowded piece o f  te rr ito ry . It is land -locked  and re la tive ly  
unp roductive . Ibos have thus genera lly  depended on other parts o f the 
N ig e ria n  Federation-. It is no a cc id e n t, the re fo re , that most Ibos who 
have acqu ired w e a lth , lik e  D r. Nnamdi A z ik iw e , and O jukw u 's own 
la te  fa th e r, have done so outside the Ibo East Centra l S tate. A very 
energetic  and industrious peop le , the Ibos own the best houses in the 
N o rth , share the contro l o f the transportation business w ith  the Yorubas, 
and a tta ined  fame and high standing in N ig e ria 's  nationa l institu tions 
and a leading representation in her in te rna tion a l delegations and foreign 
missions. The Yorubas were the firs t to ach ieve considerably high levels 
o f education and they con tinue  to lead the o ther N ige rian  tribes in this 
f ie ld .  But the Ibos are close behind the Yourbas. Last June a lo n e , for 
instance, Ibos accounted fo r nearly  2 ,5 0 0  o f new graduates o f N ige rian  
U n ive rs itie s . M any more have rece ived th e ir  various degrees in foreign 
ins titu tions  o f h igher lea rn ing . Most o f these new graduates and those 
behind them w i l l  depend on the larger N ig e ria n  market fo r jobs. Thus, 
the Federal Governm ent feels that the Ibos, in fa c t, have a greater , 
stake in the surv iva l o f N ig e ria  as a s ing le nation than any other tribe  
in the co u n try . M oreover, tha t Ibos have been the c h ie f advocates 
o f the idea o f "one N ig e r ia " .  D r. Nnam di A z ik iw e  as founder o f the 
N ig e ria n  N a tio n ; M a jo r Nzeogwu who led the January 1966 coup 
against Balewa w ith  the announced in ten tion  o f b u ild ing  a stronger 
and more un ited  N ig e r ia ; the la te  M a jo r-G e n e ra l Ironsi, w ho, weak 
and m isadvised, was nevertheless fu l ly  committed to a strong un ited 
N ig e r ia  as ind ica ted  by his i l l - fa te d  U n ita ry  Governm ent Decree o f 
M ay , 1966; and countless o ther advocates o f  a strong and un ited N ig e ria  
like  the la te  M az i Mbanu O jik e ; a l l these are and were Ibos.
S econd ly, the wounded, the orphans, the widows and the 
jobless Ibo refugees from the N orthern parts o f the country need, most 
o f a l l ,  food , she lte r, good care and re h a b ilita tio n , not war and su ic ide .
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Thus the Federal Government sees the new Ibo leadership and O jukw u 
whose source o f strength lies in an emotional appeal to Ibo tr ib a l un ity  
and the exp lo ita tio n  o f the genuine grievances which Ibo bear against 
the a ttroc itie s  committed against them in 1966r as opportun istic and 
am bitious, working against the best interests o f the Ibo advocates o f 
the idea o f One N ige ria  and against the real needs o f the suffering 
Ibo popu la tion . A cco rd ing ly , the Federal Government has a lim ited  
ob jec tive  o f crushing the O ju kw u -le d  secession e ffo rt and thus 
rescuing the vast m ajority  o f Ibos and o f other N igerians who are 
suffering and w il l  continue to suffer as long as the secession e ffo rt 
is not crushed. The Federal Government l as accompanied this 
assessment o f the situation w ith  a commitment, repeated several times 
by M a jo r-G enera l Gowon, that as soon as the rebe llion  is ended, Ibos 
w il l  return to the ir jobs and regain the ir properties in other parts o f 
the country; that for those who, out o f an understandable fear o f m o le ­
station in the North cannot return there, reasonable compensation for 
the ir properties w i l l  be made through sale o f these propetties under 
Federal Government auspices. W ith  the smaller and weaker states 
which the creation o f new states has effected in N ig e r ia , the chances 
for Federal Government supremacy and a b il ity  to honour these com m it­
ments on a nationa l basis are very good indeed. It is conce ivab le  too 
that in a new sp ir it o f co n c ilia tio n  the leaders o f the secession movement 
w il l  receive pardon in due course.
Thus the return to peace and progress in N ig e ria  depends 
very much on the qu ick ending o f O jukw u's secession. U n fo rtuna te ly , 
this ending has been prolonged by two factors: First, the O jukw u 
regime has been and is being aided by ille g a l arms dealers through 
loans guaranteed by the false expectation that the o il o f the Rivers 
people w il l  y ie ld  wealth  to the Enugu regime. Secondly, N ig e ria 's  
trad itiona l friends, G reat B rita in  and the United States have refused 
to come to her a id  a t a time she needed the ir understanding most.
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There Is a danger that N ig e ria 's  inev itab le  purchase o f arms from the 
Soviet Union (a purchase w hich is norm al, N ig e ria  being a non-a ligned 
country) may be used by the United Kingdom and the United States o f 
Am erica  to fu rthe r deny N ig e ria  the m ilita ry  equipment she needs.
Such a behaviour on the part o f the British and United States w il l  con­
s titu te  the biggest b lunder in fore ign p o lic y  w h ich  these powers shall 
have com m itted in independent A fr ic a . It w ou ld  also be th e ir greatest 
d is -se rv ice  to the Ibos themselves and a ll o ther N igerians who must 
thus necessarily be condemned to a long , b it te r  struggle o f se lf 
des truc tion . A  n o n -m ilita ry  solution o f the N ige rian  crisis js also 
s t i l l  possib le. Here the Ibo leadership could be persuaded to g ive  
up secession and agree to se ttle  the crisis w ith in  the N ige rian  co n te x t. 
O the r aspects o f such a peacefu l settlem ent would inc lude the accep t­
ance o f Enugu o f the tw e lve  states as m od ified , i f  necessary, by the 
Boundaries Commission w h ich  was provided fo r in the decree on the 
crea tion  o f states. For, w ith  the new States system, the question o f 
N orthern  dom ination and o f in te r - tr ib a l suspicions and dom ina tion , 
(which have been the root factors in N ig e ria 's  problems) would stand 
to be rem oved. Under this system, the Ibos w i l l  be in fu ll contro l 
o f th e ir  own East Centra l State (or any number o f states they may wish 
to red iv ide  i t ,  as a means o f ach iev ing  greater representation a t the 
C entre); but they w i l l  not ru le  any o ther u n w illin g  tribes e ith e r.
For, against the genuine demand o f the Ibos fo ra  fa ir ly  autonomous 
existence (at least to a llo w  time to heal th e ir  fears o f m olestation) 
is an e q u a lly  genuine demand by the E ffiks, O gojas, Ijaws, Ikwerres, 
e tc . ,  o f the South Eastern and Rivers States not to live  w ith  the Ibos 
under one roo f apart from the rest o f the coun try . It w i l l  be log ica l 
then to a llo w  the Ibos o f the Centra l Erisfem State th e ir  autonom y.
But the Ibos in the C entra l Eastern State cannot survive econom ica lly  
w ith o u t th e ir  e x p lo ita tio n  o f the resources o f the sister states. How­
eve r, Ibo autonomy cannot be granted a t the expense o f the E ffiks , 
O go jas, Ijaw s, Ikwerres, e tc . Here the Federal Government can come
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in , and regarding the p lig h t o f any community o f N igerians the 
respons ib ility  o f the w hole coun try , the Federal Governm ent can 
undertake a crash programme to assist the Centra l Eastern State for 
a temporary period during w hich the economy o f the Centra l Eastern 
State can be put on sound bases and to a llo w  wounds o f the present 
c o n f lic t  to heal so that Ibos can return to o ther parts o f the country 
to pursue th e ir leg itim a te  business. The o il and a g ricu ltu ra l w ea lth  
o f the Rivers and South Eastern States, as indeed the w ea lth  o f a ll 
o ther States in the Federation, w i l l  accrue to the Federal G overn ­
ment w hich w i l l  in turn red is tribu te  the na tiona l w ea lth  to a ll. the 
other states on the basis o f de riva tion  and need . F in a lly , the 
Federal Governm ent w i l l  take fu ll respons ib ility  for the tasks o f 
reconstruction o f w a r-to rn  parts o f the coun try , o f re se ttlin g , 
assisting, and compensating d isplaced Ibo fam ilie s , and o f guarantee­
ing fu ll p ro tection  to aJJ N ig e ria n s . The cooperation o f the Ibo 
leadership w ith  the Federal M il i ta ry  Governm ent w i l l  be essential 
to the success o f this peacefu l route to a settlem ent o f the N ig e ria n  
c ris is . But i f  the Ibo leadership does not accept this n o n -m ilita ry  
route to peace w hich  th e ir own se lf- in te re s t and commonsense d ic ta te , 
the war w i l l  go on . W ith  its superior armed forces, the Federal 
Governm ent w i l l  most c e rta in ly  crush the re b e llio n , and it  is the 
Ibos more than any o ther community in the country who would 
suffer most from that m ilita ry  so lu tion o f the na tiona l c ris is . For 
the sake o f N ig e r ia , o f A fr ic a ,  and indeed o f hum an ity , I hope 
the Ibo leadership w i l l  not lead th e ir people to such a catastrophe.
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F O O T N O T E S
1 . The creation  o f the M id-W est Region was the fu lf ilm e n t o f 
strong and persistent demands o f these non-Yoruba tribes in 
the former Western Region for th e ir own S tate. But the 
demands were on ly  part o f a N a tiona l cry fo r sp litt in g  the 
country in to  more States on s im ila r lines . W hat made the 
M id -W est exercise pun itive  on the West was the fact that 
the N orthern  and Eastern (Ibo) leaders refused to sp lit the ir 
own regions too , as demanded by s im ila r "m in o ritie s " in 
those regions. As w i l l  be seen be low , M a jo r-G ene ra l Gowon 
has now com pleted the job by s p litt in g  the whole country 
in to  12 states on a fu l ly  N a tio n a l basis.
2 . A c c o rd in g ly , the N ig e r D elta  Developm ent Board (NDDB) 
was created under the d ire c tio n  o f a Rivers econom ist, M r.
A .  Z u o fa , and to w h ich  the Federal Government made annual 
subventions fo r the econom ic developm ent o f the Rivers A rea . 
The former Eastern Regional Governm ent under Ibo leadership 
continued to neg lec t the Rivers and C a laba r-O go ja  Areas.and 
refused to  make the proper con tribu tions to the work o f the 
N D D B . In the current crisis the Enugu Regimes' a ttitu d e  to 
these m ino rity  areas in the former Eastern Region was shown 
by its a rrest, bruta l treatm ent and detention  o f M r. Z uo fa , 
the Secretary o f the N D D B.
3 .  There were three groups tha t planned the secession o f "B ia fra " . 
F irst, there were the young army o ffice rs  w ho, a fte r two coups 
in the N ig e ria n  A rm y, fe lt  unsafe to liv e  in the same barracks 
w ith  N orthern soldiers in a u n ifie d  N ige rian  A rm y. They saw 
on ly  two choices open to them -  lose th e ir m ilita ry  career 
through resignation or a separate army in an independent 
"B ia fra " . They chose the la tte r . Secondly, there were
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some e x -p o lit ic ia n s  and top c iv i l  servants who had been 
found g u ilty  o f corrupt practices by independent pub lic  
commissions o f inqu iry  set up by the Ironsi Regime and 
continued by G ow on. For these men, a separate, 
independent "B ia fra " o ffe red the best ©scape from 
Federal law enforcement agencies. F in a lly , the ie  were 
the U n ive rs ity  professors and lecturers who saw in "B ia fra " 
opportun ities  for new ambassadorial and o ther high positions. 
These un ive rs ity  in te lle c tu a ls  and top c iv i l  servants based 
predom inantly in the South and therefore the least a ffec ted  
by the disturbances in the N orth  took con tro l o f the pub lic  
in form ation media in the East and used same to s tir  up 
support fo r secession.
The tragedy o f the cris is is tha t i t  was the masses o f 
Ibomen who had a lready suffered in the events o f 1966, 
and again ignored by the Enugu regime (because in the 
c o n f lic t  w h ich  "secession in v ite d , "de fence" not "re h a b i­
l i ta t io n "  became the p r io r ity  item) who were again pushed 
on to  the war fronts to d ie  fo r "B ia fra " .
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